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Blackstonian absolute dominion over an object to a bundle of rights and
obligations that recognizes, if not encourages, the splitting of property
interests among different people. The development of the bundle of rights
conception of property occurred in roughly the same era as the enactment
of the modern federal income tax. Nevertheless, when Congress enacted
the tax in 1913, it did not consider how the nuances of property, and the
possible splitting of the property interests in an income-producing item,
might affect application of the tax. Soon after the tax’s enactment, the
Treasury Department and the courts were confronted with questions of who
owned, and could be taxed on, what income. As shown by an examination
of family partnerships and synthetic leases, the government continues to
struggle with determining who owns a sufficient property interest to be
taxed because Congress has yet to define ownership for tax purposes.
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I. FROM BLACKSTONE TO BUNDLES
Sir William Blackstone made famous the conception of property as
“that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe.”1 This vision of property attributes to the owner
almost total control. Despite the resonance of this Blackstonian ideal, truly
despotic ownership over property has never been possible. Society
demands constraints on what owners are allowed to do with their property;
and many owners sell or give away some, but not all, rights to their
property. Today Blackstone’s view of property as a solitary thing—owned
and controlled by one—is a fiction, although one that continues to have
political power. Instead, we divide some attributes of ownership here, we
limit some rights there, each of these responses to modern life flying in the
face of our Blackstonian conception of property.
If Blackstone could impose his view of property on the United States
today, the income tax could be easily and fairly applied. Whoever owned a
piece of property, and only one person could, would be taxed on the
income that the property produced. Property owners’ ability to convey
away limited rights to property complicates this story. Congress did not
consider this complication when it drafted the 1913 income tax,
notwithstanding growing understanding in many quarters that property was
a “bundle of rights.”2 In roughly the same period as the modern income
tax’s enactment, policymakers began to realize that different people could
have different rights to portions of property. Nevertheless, Congress
imposed on the tax a conception of property consistent with the earlier
Blackstonian vision.

1

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
The metaphor has been traced to the late nineteenth century. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER,
COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 322 n.40 (1997). The term was not used by Wesley Hohfeld who is often
credited with this conception of property. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
2
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Property as an abstract compilation of different types of rights could
be, and often was, owned by different people. To the extent that property
was owned by more than one person, whether what a person owned was
appropriate to be taxed was open to debate. Despite this issue, Congress
originally ignored the potential complexity of ownership when it taxed the
income “of” an individual.3 That phrasing presupposed Blackstone’s
understanding of ownership, and for a significant period of time no one felt
the need to determine ownership for tax purposes.4 That this fundamental
issue was ignored might not be surprising in the world of congressional
politics when income tax rates were low and the amount of revenue it
raised was small compared to the other federal taxes. Nevertheless, the
failure of Congress to grapple head-on with this issue of taxation in the
midst of an evolving understanding of ownership has resulted in legal
confusion and costly litigation over the application of the federal income
tax.
Soon after the 1913 income tax’s enactment, the Treasury Department
was confronted with numerous tax returns, the tax liability of which turned
on the ownership of property. In the early decades of the income tax, the
potential to fracture ownership was contested most often with respect to
family property (as many of the business arrangements and financial
products that currently utilize complex ownership structures were not yet
imagined). Partnerships, trusts, contracts, community property laws, all
provided the opportunity for interested parties to argue about who owned
what and what ownership meant. Although ownership evoked
consideration of power and control, dispersing ownership, if only for tax
purposes, allowed families as a collective to have more income taxed in
lower tax brackets, thereby encouraging the fracturing of ownership as a
means of tax reduction. In the face of these contests, the question arose
whether the federal government would develop a federal common law of
ownership for income tax purposes to answer the question of who should
be taxed on what.
This Article progresses in three parts. First, this Article briefly
discusses the political and judicial history of the income tax. The
antecedent to the modern income tax was enacted in 1913, at the height of
the Progressive Era. In a time of reform and dreams of reform, Congress
passed an income tax based on the idea of a redistributive tax but without a
plan for how the tax would actually work.5 The rhetoric of class legislation
and redistributing from the rich to the poor that permeated earlier debates
over the income tax was common to Progressive Era politics. Since there
3

See Tariff of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166–81.
Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1396, 1400–01
(1975).
5
Stephanie Hunter McMahon, A Law with a Life of Its Own: The Development of the Federal
Income Tax Statutes Through World War I, 7 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 4 (2009).
4
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was an established focus on the income tax as class legislation, that focus
allowed Congress to either miss or ignore the importance of the ownership
question. Second, this Article discusses the evolution in the Progressive Era
of the idea of ownership and the expansiveness of property interests.
Although Congress was not focused on this issue when it enacted the 1913
income tax, the ensuing complications in the development of this legal
concept nevertheless shaped what the income tax would become.
Developments in legal theory independent of taxation provided the
arguments necessary for taxpayers to minimize their taxes. It appears that
Congress did not anticipate this cross-pollination of ideas between the law
of property and taxation.
Finally, examining first family partnerships and then synthetic leases,
this Article evaluates the consequences of Congress’s position (or lack
thereof) on the meaning of ownership. In each, the government’s desire to
apply the tax consistently on a national level required it to define
ownership broadly, not only as legal title but also, at times, as control or
beneficial enjoyment. Moreover, acknowledgement that something was
owned was sometimes dismissed because of the focus on how or why the
interest was created. With respect to family partnerships, the Supreme
Court often focused on the creation of the partnership and whether its
creation was valid rather than examining the rights purported partners had
in the partnership. The result was less deference to state partnership law,
but this lack of deference risked creating situations where state law owners
were not taxed on their property interests’ income. For synthetic leases, the
Treasury Department focuses on the benefits and burdens created by these
transactions as opposed to following legal title. The results are that the
transactions produce favorable tax results with corresponding favorable,
but different, results for financial accounting purposes.
Thus, although “ownership of income and property is the lodestar” of
taxation, it contains its own ambiguities.6 This Article’s examination of this
issue does not mean that a definitive rule for determining ownership can or
will be found. As a nation, we have not yet defined what it means to own
something. Therefore, it may be too much to expect Congress to define it in
a satisfactory way for federal tax purposes. Nevertheless, the Article’s
lesson should caution against creating an income tax regime that assumes
ownership is understood and quantifiable.
II. HISTORY OF THE INCOME TAX
Scholars debate the causes for the United States’ ratification of the
Sixteenth Amendment and its enactment of the modern income tax. Sidney
6

Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Saving Seaborn: Ownership Not Marriage as the Basis of Family Taxation,
86 IND. L.J. 1459, 1462 (2011). Ventry notes the Court’s imposition of an “expansive definition of
ownership” for tax purposes. Id. at 1464.

962

108:959 (2014)

Bundle of Confusion for the Income Tax

Ratner portrays a progressive struggle between the forces of societal justice
and those protecting private gain.7 Robert Stanley, on the other hand,
argues that the tax reflects a statist attempt to prevent real economic
redistribution; therefore, the enactment of the mild income tax was no more
than the guileful use of political rhetoric.8 A stronger neoconservative
interpretation by Robert Higgs argues the income tax was an opportunity
for interest groups to gain for themselves through the redistribution of
income and special funding.9 Finally, W. Elliot Brownlee takes what he
terms a “democratic institutionalist” perspective, arguing the progressive
income tax reflected developing ideas and values but was limited by
institutional restrictions in the final shaping of the income tax.10 Each
theory examines the ideas that policymakers and the public discussed at the
time of the enactment of the 1913 income tax, and each theory underscores
that few cared about the details of the income tax’s operation.
The income tax, a tax that currently wields tremendous political and
economic power, was initially adopted more for rhetorical than
redistributive goals.11 The Congressional Record reflects the income tax’s
relative insignificance to Congress in the second half of the nineteenth
century, when debates over the tax were repeatedly abandoned in favor of
discussion of more pressing tax issues, namely tariffs.12 The debates on the
income tax that did occur centered most often on the tax’s class-based
elements. The question of redistribution, and whether this was a
permissible objective for Congress, meant that operational issues of the
new income tax were given short shrift. Thus opportunities for debating,
and perhaps resolving, issues of ownership and property as they would
arise under the income tax were missed. Similarly, the two previous times
Congress had enacted an income tax provided little evidence of how the tax
actually worked when it was challenged. For example, the Civil War
individual income tax, as a war measure, faced fewer challenges than the
modern tax. Only two cases reached the Supreme Court in the eleven years
between its enactment and repeal, whether for reasons of patriotic
taxpaying or for want of enforcement.13 On the other hand, in the same time
7

SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 298–340 (1967); see also RANDOLPH
E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 77–104 (1954).
8
ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER 13 (1993).
9
ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 112–13 (1987); see also Ben Baack & Edward John Ray, The Political Economy of the
Origin and Development of the Federal Income Tax, in EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN POLITICAL
ECONOMY 121, 135 (Robert Higgs ed., 1985).
10
W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA 265–68 (2d ed. 2004).
11
McMahon, supra note 5, at 2–3.
12
Id. at 10–11, 16–17, 21–22.
13
See Gray v. Darlington, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 63 (1872) (evaluating the ability to tax gain on the
sale of U.S. bonds); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870) (assessing the ability to tax
members of state governments).
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frame after enactment of the 1913 income tax, almost forty cases reached
the highest Court.14 Taxpayers challenged the earlier income tax less
frequently, putting less pressure on defining the details of the tax.
When Congress enacted the income tax first during the Civil War, and
then again during a major depression, it regarded these small revenue
raisers as ancillary components of larger revenue bills.15 These early
income taxes crystalized the debate regarding the tax’s class-based
features. The continuing debate of this issue meant the focus remained on
the justification for the tax itself. For example, during the Civil War,
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee Justin Morrill, who
otherwise argued Congress would have to accept the income tax even if it
was the “least defensible” part of the revenue bill, questioned: “Ought not
men, too, with large incomes to pay more in proportion to what they have
than those with limited means, who live by the work of their own hands or
that of their families?”16 Supporters of the Civil War income tax portrayed
it as a balance to the otherwise regressive national tax regime:
We tax the tea, the coffee, the sugar, the spices the poor man uses. We tax
every little thing that is imported from abroad, together with the whisky that
makes him drunk and the beer that cheers him and the tobacco that consoles
him. Everything that he consumes we call a luxury and tax it; and yet we are
afraid to touch the income of Mr. Astor. Is there any justice in that?17

Opponents focused on perceived inequity in the income tax itself.
Thaddeus Stevens argued, “It seems to me that it is a strange way to punish
men because they are rich.”18
Thereafter, reformers proposed the income tax intermittently to fund
new programs and to demonstrate—both to reform’s friends and foes
alike—a desire for change.19 With the focus on reforming the fiscal
program, the class-based debates continued. At the time of the enactment of
the second income tax during the Panic of 1893, when many believed that
money, monopoly, and the concentration of wealth threatened the
foundation of democracy, a limited income tax was viewed as “a check that
14

See, e.g., Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920) (denying ability to tax federal judges); S. Pac. Co.
v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918) (denying ability to tax income earned prior to enactment of the tax);
Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918) (denying stock dividend is taxable income); Brushaber v. Union
Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916) (denying shareholder the ability to restrain corporation from complying
with the tax).
15
McMahon, supra note 5, at 10–11, 16–17, 21–22. This is not to dismiss earlier theoretical work
regarding the equity of an income tax but to highlight the sparseness of intelligence on the working of
such a tax.
16
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1196 (1862); See also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.
1876, 2513–14 (1864) (additional statements regarding class-based taxation).
17
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 4715 (1870) (statement of Roger Sherman).
18
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1876 (1864).
19
See, e.g., HARRY EDWIN SMITH, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL INTERNAL TAX HISTORY FROM
1861 TO 1871, at 74–75 (1914); see also HIGGS, supra note 9, at 97.
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will measurably stop these vast accumulations.”20 The focus, however, was
not always on the tax’s impact on the wealthy. One critic complained, “I
oppose this bill because I will not consent by any act of mine to place the
humblest or the poorest of my fellow-citizens on a political plane one shade
lower than that occupied by the richest and the proudest.”21
The Supreme Court’s invalidation of the 1894 income tax a scant five
months after the tax’s enactment demonstrated the Court’s focus on the
class-based features of the tax.22 Although the Court’s holding in Pollock v.
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. was narrow, in dicta the majority took a
broader and more hostile view toward income taxation, arguing that
“[n]othing can be clearer than that what the Constitution intended to guard
against was the exercise by the general government of the power of directly
taxing persons and property within any State through a majority made up
from the other States.”23 Justice Stephen Field opined, “The present assault
upon capital is but the beginning. It will be but the stepping-stone to others,
larger and more sweeping, till our political contests will become a war of
the poor against the rich . . . .”24 The dissents of Justices Edward Douglass
White and John Marshall Harlan characterized the majority as a selfconscious, economic class acting in its own interests.25
With the new century and the rise of progressivism, people
increasingly questioned economic divisions within the nation and searched
for ways to reduce them. In the 1908 presidential election, both Democrats
and Republicans supported some version of a federal income tax.26 Some
supporters advocated “an income tax not as a temporary measure for the
purpose of securing revenue for temporary purposes, but because we
believe it should be a permanent part and portion of the revenue system of
the United States.”27 No longer was the income tax seen solely as a revenue
stopgap, but it was seen by some at least as a viable long-term method of
inserting the federal government into the national economy.28 However, this

20

26 CONG. REC. 1730 (1894) (statement of Joseph Sibley); see GERALD T. WHITE, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE PROBLEM OF RECOVERY AFTER 1893 (1982) (not even mentioning the income tax);
see also HIGGS, supra note 9, at 79–97.
21
26 CONG. REC. app. 465 (1894) (statement of William Bourke Cockran).
22
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 583, modified on reh’g, 158
U.S. 601 (1895).
23
Id. at 582.
24
Id. at 607 (opinion of Field, J.).
25
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601, 671–75 (1985) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); id. at 712–13 (White, J., dissenting).
26
Paolo E. Coletta, Election of 1908, in HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 841,
866 (Gil Troy et al. eds., 4th ed. 2012).
27
44 CONG. REC. 1680 (1909) (statement of Sen. Borah); see also William E. Borah, Income-Tax
Amendment, 191 N. AM. REV. 755, 755–61 (1910) (urging adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment).
28
STANLEY, supra note 8, at 195–98.
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proposal failed to win sufficient support in Congress until passage of a
constitutional amendment.
By the 1912 presidential election, with ratification of the Sixteenth
Amendment still uncertain, the progressive movement peaked.29 Coming to
power after the extravagance of the Gilded Age, Progressives and radical
Democrats openly opposed big business and increasingly targeted the
concentration of wealth and power. As part of this policy change, the
Progressive Era witnessed a paradigmatic shift to recognizing a need to
fund government based on taxpayers’ ability to pay. The income tax was a
necessary component of this new system. Although President Woodrow
Wilson urged moderation,30 in his 1913 inaugural address he also called for
tariff reform, a hot political topic.31 Many expected Wilson to use the
income tax to make up revenues lost from this reform.32 Then, after the
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, Wilson called a special
congressional session, and the House Ways and Means Committee reported
a bill less than a week later.33
In developing their ideas on taxation, Progressive Era politicians
looked to economists and political theorists who were working through the
ideas of the income tax.34 New tax policies advocated by this first
generation of professionally trained academics focused on the “mutual
interdependence of modern social relations.”35 Commentators, such as
Edwin R.A. Seligman, softened the rhetoric used to describe the benefits
and burdens of the tax, and the tax came to be perceived as a respectable
revenue measure.36 “The history of finance . . . shows the evolution of the
principle of faculty or ability to pay—the principle that each individual
should be held to help the state in proportion to his ability to help
himself.”37 Despite the evolution in the supporting arguments for the tax,
many practical issues were left open. Seligman, for example, questioned
29

George E. Mowry, Election of 1912, in HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS,
supra note 26, at 877, 877.
30
Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Furnifold M. Simmons (Sept. 4, 1913), in 28 THE PAPERS OF
WOODROW WILSON 254, 254 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1978).
31
H.R. DOC. NO. 63-1, at 3–5 (1913) (address by President Wilson to a joint session of Congress);
see also S. DOC. NO. 63-3, at 3–6 (1913) (inaugural address of President Wilson).
32
See, e.g., Cuts Message Short, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1913, at 4; Holland’s Letter, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 7, 1913, at 1.
33
H.R. DOC. NO. 63-1, at 3–5 (1913) (President Wilson’s address to Congress); accord H.R. 10
(1913) (bill reported by the House Committee).
34
Ajay K. Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era Economists
and the Intellectual Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1793, 1798 (2005); M.
Susan Murnane, Selling Scientific Taxation: The Treasury Department’s Campaign for Tax Reform in
the 1920s, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 819, 824 (2004).
35
Mehrotra, supra note 34, at 1811.
36
Compare EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX 631–73 (2d ed. 1914), with Edwin R.A.
Seligman, The Theory of Progressive Taxation, 8 POL. SCI. Q. 220, 244–51 (1893).
37
SELIGMAN, INCOME TAX, supra note 36, at 4.
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what constituted income in the new tax and whether all sources of income
should be treated equally.38 Because the debate was framed as an attack on
earlier forms of taxation, it remained a political science and economics
issue instead of also being a legal one that should involve those interested
in questions of property.
There was no opposition voiced to the income tax in the House; the
strongest opinions attempted either to raise or lower the exemption level.39
Likewise in the Senate, where there was a smaller but more radical
Democratic majority, there was relatively little debate. Republicans
generally ignored the income tax.40 The tax that was enacted imposed a
graduated tax on individual incomes above a $3000 exemption for
individuals and a $4000 exemption for married couples.41 These
exemptions were high when the mean adult male income was only $578.42
The tax rate was 1% on all taxable income after deductions and the
exemption. An additional surtax ranged from 1% to 6% on amounts in
excess of $20,000. The highest combined rate was 7% on incomes above
$500,000.43 This income tax was less progressive and less ambitious than
the Civil War legislation, and it gave little hint that the income tax would
become the dominant source of federal revenue.44
Notwithstanding the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, public
sentiment was never solidly in support of a federal income tax, possibly
because of its limited impact.45 At first the revenue generated by the income
tax was minimal, yielding only $71 million, or 9.7% of the federal
government’s ordinary revenue, in 1914.46 In 1913, only 1.5% of all
households paid federal income taxes, and only 2% of the labor force paid
income taxes each year from 1913 through 1915.47 The yield grew but
remained relatively low until World War I limited other sources of revenue,
forcing Congress to increase income tax rates and lower its exemptions.48
38

See id. at 16 (considering ability to pay).
See, e.g., 50 CONG. REC. 1252, 1254–55, 3851–52 (1913) (remarks of Rep. Murray (D–OK),
Rep. Britten (R–IL), Rep. Bristow (R–KS), and Rep. Williams (D–MS)).
40
50 CONG. REC. 3839–40 (1913) (not entering the debate).
41
Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 168.
42
STANLEY, supra note 8, at 249.
43
§ 2, 38 Stat. at 166.
44
See Joseph A. Hill, The Income Tax of 1913, 28 Q.J. ECON. 46 (1913), for a discussion written at
the time.
45
STANLEY, supra note 8, at 225–26; see also The Income-Tax Amendment, 46 LITERARY DIG.
325, 326 (1913); The Income-Tax Plan, 46 LITERARY DIG. 877, 877–78 (1913); The Income Tax Under
Fire, 46 LITERARY DIG. 1163, 1163–64 (1913).
46
STANLEY, supra note 8, at 227.
47
W. Elliot Brownlee, Historical Perspective on U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich, in DOES ATLAS
SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 29, 41–42 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000).
48
For a discussion of World War I financing, see CHARLES GILBERT, AMERICAN FINANCING OF
WORLD WAR I 75–116 (1970); W. Elliot Brownlee, Wilson and Financing the Modern State: The
Revenue Act of 1916, 129 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC. 173, 191 (1985); Ajay K. Mehrotra, Lawyers, Guns,
39
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A $177 million budget deficit—rather than concerns for the equity of
the tax system’s operation—caused Congress to push down personal
exemption levels and raise income tax rates during World War I.49 More
than $1 billion was raised by the federal income tax, with exemptions
reduced from $4000 for heads of families and $3000 for single individuals
to $2000 and $1000 respectively, and top rates raised to 67% in 1917 and
77% in 1918.50 Those shouldering the burden of this much stiffer income
tax were only a small percentage of the population. In 1918, approximately
15% of American families had to pay some amount of personal income tax,
but the wealthiest 1% paid 80% of the revenues raised.51 The average
effective rates for this elite group increased from 3% in 1916 to 15% in
1918.52
Despite ensuing tax cuts, the nation did not bounce back from the war
by reducing taxes to prewar levels.53 Scholars have shown that, although
income tax rates were reduced in the 1920s, World War I permanently
changed the federal tax system. By the 1920s, many in the Treasury
Department were pushing what they viewed as scientific taxation, and their
policy did not entail elimination of the income tax.54 Not accepting
scientific claims behind tax policy, economist Thomas S. Adams opined,
“In taxation . . . let me make the deals and I care not who makes the
ideals.”55 One of the greatest of the early American tax experts, Adams had
no illusions about altruistic or even equitable principles driving the tax law.
Rather, he saw policymaking as a “group contest in which powerful
interests vigorously endeavor to rid themselves of present or proposed tax
burdens.”56 In Adams’s view, these interest groups divided largely on
economic or class lines, leading him to conclude that “[c]lass politics is of
the essence of taxation.”57

and Public Moneys: The U.S. Treasury, World War I, and the Administration of the Modern Fiscal
State, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 173, 181 (2010).
49
President Wilson and leading members of the Democratic Party did attack concentrations of
wealth, although primarily wealth held in corporate form, in order to finance government spending on
the War on the basis of highly progressive taxation. ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 48–50 (1940); BROWNLEE, supra note 10, at 60–63.
50
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, Pub. L. No. 65-254, §§ 210–211, 216, 40 Stat. 1057, 1062–64,
1069 (1919).
51
BROWNLEE, supra note 10, at 63.
52
Id.
53
Anne Alstott & Ben Novick, War, Taxes, and Income Redistribution in the Twenties: The 1924
Veterans’ Bonus and the Defeat of the Mellon Plan, 59 TAX L. REV. 373, 374 (2006).
54
Thomas S. Adams, Fundamental Problems of Federal Income Taxation, 35 Q.J. ECON. 527,
537–40 (1921); Murnane, supra note 34.
55
T.S. Adams, Ideals and Idealism in Taxation, 18 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1 (1928).
56
Id.
57
Id.
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Although issues of redistribution still pervaded debates, people were
increasingly aware of implementation issues, including questions of who
should be taxed on particular items of income.58 After complaining that the
Internal Revenue Code did not define property, one practitioner concluded,
“It would do well enough for a primitive civilization, . . . but it does not
suffice under our complex doctrines of successive estates and interests
splitting up the absolute ownership of property.”59 Property held in trust or
on a chain of legal limitations was recognized to change in value, and the
question remained what should be taxed and at what valuation.60 Some
problems took a while to be recognized in their entirety. For example, only
once the Supreme Court conclusively ruled in 1921 that the appreciation of
capital assets must be included in income could the issue of who should be
taxed on the realization of future interests be assessed.61
How the federal government would respond to tax planning based on
splitting the ownership of property among various taxpayers was not
foreordained. As discussed in Part IV below, in cases involving taxpayers
and their returns that made their way to the highest court, the Supreme
Court went back and forth between federal and state law to give substance
to the federal tax as it sought to determine ownership. The Supreme Court
began by imposing a Blackstonian sense of ownership. However, as the old
Blackstonian theory of ownership lost ground as the governing theory of
property, the Court began to recognize that it must alter its approach to
these questions. Thus, despite a consistent reference to ownership, how the
courts interpreted ownership changed over time and in different contexts,
and it remains an undefined term. The focus on different indicia of
ownership (whether title, benefit, or control) highlights the evolving, and
ultimately uncertain, meaning of ownership within income taxation.
Attempting to characterize ownership as a simple rule minimizes the
difficult choices that necessarily arise when applying the concept. This
recognition continues to have consequences in everything from family
transfers of property to complex financial products. In other words,
ownership remains a complicated concept for the income tax.
III. EVOLVING SENSE OF PROPERTY
Conceptions of property can be placed on a spectrum between, on one
hand, the Blackstonian asset model and, on the other, a bundle of rights and
58

See, e.g., Adams, Fundamental Problems, supra note 54; Alexander M. Hamburg, Exemption of
State and Municipal Securities from Federal Income Taxation, 7 VA. L. REV. 195, 198–200 (1921);
John M. Maguire, Income Taxes on the Realization of Future Interests, 31 YALE L.J. 367, 369–72
(1921); Edward Rightor, Are Inheritance Taxes Deductible?, 2 LOY. L. REV. 20, 20–22 (1921); Arthur
L. Corbin, Comment, Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE L.J. 429, 429 (1921).
59
Maguire, supra note 58, at 373.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 367.

969

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

obligations. These two paradigms reflect different understandings of what
property is and what property provides to its owner.62 The Blackstonian
view envisions an owner who has almost total power over his or her
property. Conversely, focusing less on the thing itself, the bundle theory
emphasizes the interrelationships among societal actors and the property
plus the rights and obligations that property creates for its owners.
Accepting that property is a bundle of rights means that not only is the
owner’s relation to the property at issue but, more importantly, the owner’s
relation to other stakeholders is at issue.
Although this Article opened with Blackstone’s broad definition of
ownership, any attachment to that view was relatively short lived in the
United States. The push against this monolithic notion of property began in
the nineteenth century in order to facilitate that century’s economic
growth.63 In a capital-scarce society, there was a need for the judicial
philosophies underpinning property rights to encourage economic
development. Post-Civil War growth only spurred the developing meaning
of property. Morton Horwitz once explained, “The basic problem of legal
thinkers after the Civil War was how to articulate a conception of property
that could accommodate the tremendous expansion in the variety of forms
of ownership spawned by a dynamic industrial society.”64
Despite economic development pushing the concept of property to
accommodate new ownership forms, the change was not instantaneous. The
concept of property evolved over the nineteenth century from a physical
entity to something that was more abstract and relative.65 This was, at first,
a minority opinion. Justice Noah Swayne dissented in 1872 that “[p]roperty
is everything which has an exchangeable value.”66 By 1890, in the first
Minnesota Rate Case, the Supreme Court had accepted that property was
the exchange value of anything.67 The de-physicalization of property in the
rate cases produced radical changes in the law of property because these
cases forced judges to explain abstract notions of property.68 In Smyth v.
Ames, for example, the Court struggled to define the value of the railroad’s
property interest in its transit runs—the actual trips that it took over its
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rails.69 Although Smyth became a subject of controversy among economists
by the 1920s regarding the appropriate valuation of the new property, that it
was property was no longer in doubt.70
The conception of property as a bundle of abstract rights was further
developed when the government made expansive use of its eminent domain
power to take property to aid economic development. It was in the
evolution of the jurisprudence of eminent domain that property first
developed into a bundle of rights.71 In the prior century, judges focused on
compensated versus inconsequential damages when they policed the taking
of property. As the law evolved beyond the idea of physical property, and
value became increasingly concentrated in commercial and intangible
property rights, theorists attempted to redefine the “taking” involved in
eminent domain cases away from the idea of a physical invasion of space
toward the reduction of market value.72 Market value had become one stick
in the bundle that was property. As a result of the pressure brought to bear
by eminent domain, one treatise claimed in 1888, “The dullest individual
among the people knows and understands that his property in anything is a
bundle of rights.”73
Although property has since lost ground in the popular imagination to
other legal issues, such as free speech and the right to bear arms,
throughout the early period of the income tax, property was a central value
in American legal thought.74 It was in the Progressive Era that scholars
recognized the bundle concept as a means of reconciling the competing
needs of property. Individuals and the government wanted property to
mean much more than the Blackstonian conception allowed. Property
rights were no longer merely a negative right to exclude others but included
some degree of obligation to others.
These new demands clouded the meaning of property as legal theorists
worked through the conception of property to accommodate Progressive
and, later, Realist reforms. Wesley N. Hohfeld noted that:
Both with lawyers and with laymen this term [property] has no definite or
stable connotation. Sometimes it is employed to indicate the physical object to
which various legal rights, privileges, etc., relate; then again—with far greater
discrimination and accuracy—the word is used to denote the legal interest (or
aggregate of legal relations) appertaining to such physical object.75
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Hohfeld recognized a need to define various legal interests and
relations in property through the creation of a schema for analyzing what
makes up these legal conceptions.76 Hohfeld pushed a “radical
reconstruction” of American society and, in the process, analyzed property
in furtherance of society’s “underlying policies and purposes” in a manner
that made popular the bundle of rights conception.77
As a result of Hohfeld’s work, Arthur L. Corbin stated in 1922, “Our
concept of property has shifted; . . . property has ceased to describe any res,
or object of sense, at all, and has become merely a bundle of legal
relations—rights, powers, privileges, immunities.”78 For these early
Realists, the bundle of rights was malleable so that sticks of the bundle
could be adjusted and rearranged to fit the needs of the day.79 To the extent
the sticks described infinitely variable relations between people and there
was no requirement of what must be in the bundle itself, policy concerns
were expected to drive changes to the notion of property itself.
These radical ideas were developing in the era of the 1913 income tax
and yet the tax did not acknowledge these evolving issues.80 Instead, tax
policymakers focused more on the issues proposed by other academic
leaders.81 For example, Robert L. Hale argued, also in 1922, that
“[o]wnership is an indirect method whereby the government coerces some
to yield an income to the owners. When the law turns around and curtails
the incomes of property owners, it is in substance curtailing the salaries of
public officials or pensioners.”82 According to Hale, if property law
strongly limits others’ ability to use one’s property by broadly construing
property rights and punishing infringements, the owner may demand high
prices for the use of his property; if the limits imposed by property law are
light, his prices must be low.83 Under this view, property was a form of
theft; ownership of its income rested on legal rights, and, therefore, this
ownership could be altered at any time.84 Taxation of income, so Hale
76
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argued, should redistribute income from the rich to the poor to correct the
theft that was property.85 Hale’s discussion of property was more consistent
with the class-based arguments surrounding the income tax, rather than the
more nuanced ideas of Hohfeld.
Over fifty years after Corbin and Hale weighed in on property, long
after the enactment of the income tax in 1913, Thomas Grey proclaimed the
“disintegration” of property and the completion of the “substitution of a
bundle-of-rights for thing–ownership conception of property.”86 Realists
continued in their desire to use the evolving notions of property rights to
mitigate the harms created by prior economic development. Grey argued
the disintegration of property was “intrinsic to the development of a freemarket economy into an industrial phase.”87 The dissolution of the
traditional concept of property could be said to have eroded the moral basis
of capitalism because, to the extent property was not an absolute right,
redistribution from rich to poor might no longer be objectionable.88 If the
state was no longer a neutral enforcer of the private relations of ownership
and contract, but had become a player that uses collective force on behalf
of haves and have-nots, the use of complex property ideas would allow
peaceful redistribution.89
This developing conception of property, which had begun by the time
of the 1913 income tax’s enactment, allowed people to divide the rights,
duties, and power, plus the other attributes of property, among various
people. For example, it was settled by 1938 that, with the power of
alienation, “[a]ctually the ‘transferor’ simply destroys certain rights and
powers in himself and creates others—not necessarily the same ones—in
someone else.”90 Property could no longer fit within the earlier
Blackstonian mold.
A constraining force on this conceptual evolution in the early
twentieth century was the relative lack of private pressure to fracture
property interests. At the end of the nineteenth century, most forces
pushing the definition of property interests were from the government
through rate setting and eminent domain. In this period, there were fewer
needs, or opportunities, for individuals to separate the bundle of property
rights. For example, trusts were generally limited to provide for
disadvantaged family members, to bind an estate within a family, or for
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charities.91 Similarly, partnerships between spouses were not recognized by
many states until the 1920s and 1930s.92 Studies have not yet shown why
states changed their laws at this time, whether it was solely in recognition
of the women’s rights movement or in part to seek tax minimization.93
Nevertheless, the opportunities for taxpayers to fracture their property grew
in conjunction with the income tax, building on a relatively broadly
accepted conception of property as a bundle of rights.
Regardless of whether members of Congress accepted some, or none,
of this conception of property, ownership for income tax purposes could
have been based on a number of characteristics of property recognized long
before 1913. These characteristics were more easily identified as separate
with the fracturing of ownership and have since become sticks in the
bundle of property rights. Legal title is an obvious element on which to
impose the income tax. Objectively easy to measure, inequities may arise if
those with the power and the benefit of the property can transfer legal title
without losing those benefits. One alternate test is a control test: whoever
controls the property that generates the income should be taxed on it.
Although this test sounds straightforward, it could raise complicated issues
of what “control” itself means. For example, within marriage, does the
spouse who controls family finances own all of the family’s property?
Another test looks to who benefits from income or the underlying property.
This most abstract of the tests would require an analysis of benefit, after
defining some measure of benefit. Each of these tests—focused on different
attributes of ownership—has been used by courts at different times to
determine ownership for income tax purposes.94
Not everyone accepted, or accepts today, the idea of property as a
bundle of rights. Laymen’s perception of property as akin to the
Blackstonian ideal has likely not evolved since Bruce Ackerman noted it as
such in 1977 or Thomas Grey in 1980.95 As for scholars, in particular over
the last several decades, there has been a reaction against the bundle
conception.96 One critic argued that at its extreme the bundle has “no
91
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independent or essential content.”97 Scholars warn that we should not take
the bundle imagery too seriously and that, even for those trained in the law,
the absolutist notion of property prevails.98 Nonetheless, these critiques of
the paradigm in the property law context risk dismissing the value of the
bundle conception, especially with respect to taxation. One study
completed in 2009 found that a difference in the understanding of the term
“property” does exist and that those who view their rights to property in a
Blackstonian way are less likely to part with their rights than those who
accept the bundle of rights paradigm.99 Consequently, framing property as a
bundle of rights weakens perceptions of absolute ownership. With this
rethinking of property, taxation is more complicated in operation but is less
likely to be resisted.
To the extent one accepts some version of the bundle of rights,
presumably any attribute of property, such as title, control, or benefit,
associated in some way with the property’s income could be taxed under
the income tax. To guide tax authorities as to which stick is appropriate for
income taxation, the tax system should incorporate an overt definition of
property in order for the tax to apply properly to the income “of” the
taxpayer. This clarification is unlikely to come soon. That the old
Blackstonian concept of property was adopted in 1913 is unfortunate
because it allowed Congress to forego debate on this issue. The abstract
rights since created by sophisticated contracting and financial engineering
threaten a tax system that is built on the conception of property as a
physical res. Back then, however, Congress was stuck in the mode of
thinking of property as a physical thing, for which ownership was clear,
and did not address the bundle of issues that have since become important.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE BUNDLE OF CONFUSION
Soon after enactment of the income tax, it became clear that issues of
ownership would have to be unraveled by the Treasury Department and the
courts. The lack of a congressionally crafted, nuanced understanding of
property made it difficult to decipher who should be taxed on particular
sums of income. Families were often the locus of these early debates.
Because of the income tax’s progressive rates, families had an economic
incentive to have as many members as possible “own” parts of the property
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that generated families’ livelihood. Today issues of ownership extend far
beyond the family. As an example, in synthetic leases the IRS must
determine whether the lessor or lessee should be treated as the owner of the
leased property for tax purposes. Thus the Treasury Department and the
courts parse the meaning of ownership after the fact in various economic
arrangements.
Initially the Supreme Court took positions on ownership that
aggregated ownership attributes under the Blackstonian conception of
property. The Court argued that if the taxpayer “retains for himself so many
of the attributes of ownership,” he could not claim to be “the victim of
despotic power when for the purpose of taxation he is treated as owner
altogether.”100 When this theory conflicted with legal title, the Court held
that Congress “may tax not only ownership, but any right or privilege that
is a constituent of ownership.”101 Slowly developing a federal common law
of ownership for federal income tax purposes, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. led the Court to standardize the income tax treatment of
disparate ownership forms.102 Justice Benjamin Cardozo agreed that the
purpose for devices that fractured ownership was to make it possible “for
the taxpayer to surrender title to another and to keep dominion for himself,
or if not technical dominion, at least the substance of enjoyment.”103
The Court was not making control or benefit a substitute for
ownership but instead was recognizing, at least in some cases, that control
and benefit were sticks in the bundle of property rights. On the other hand,
they were not the only permissible sticks to tax. In Poe v. Seaborn, the
Court found that community property law’s designation of the husband as
manager of community property “was but a recognition of the ownership of
another.”104 H.G. Seaborn’s salary was therefore owned one-half by his
wife at the time it was earned. Thus, ownership for tax purposes was
certainly more than legal title; what more had to be worked out for each
property-dividing arrangement.
At times the Supreme Court created rules to define ownership—as it
did with respect to community property—that were based on specific sticks
in the property bundle. In Lucas v. Earl, Guy Earl failed to convince the
Court that his contract with his wife giving her one-half of his wages
changed the ownership of the property for income tax purposes.105
Thereafter, control over the creation of wage income has been a sufficient
100
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interest for income taxation, except for those married couples governed by
community property and Poe v. Seaborn. In Corliss v. Bowers, the Court
held that although a revocable trust’s income accrued completely and
irrevocably to the beneficiary, the creator of the trust could shift income
through use of the trust without losing any control over the underlying
property and therefore the creator of the trust should be taxed on income he
did not legally own.106 Ownership has thus been based on many different
attributes of property. The complexities of knowing what will trigger an
income tax obligation continue to trouble the system.
A. Family Partnerships
Family partnerships have historically forced questions of who owns
what, although the question today arises more for estate than income tax
purposes.107 In answering this question, the IRS and the courts focus on
whether the creation of the partnership was for tax avoidance purposes or
for business reasons. Focusing on the purpose rather than the state law
property interests that are created means the government has effectively
created a federal common law of family partnership taxation. The result
might be a political necessity. State law originally did not permit spousal
partnerships, and when that policy changed,108 some families sought to use
the partnership form, as they did with contracts and trusts, to reduce their
collective taxes. One example of this perceived abuse is the use of a family
partnership to avoid hundreds of thousands of dollars in federal income tax
by James W. Cannon, one of the richest men in North Carolina in the
1920s.109 Cannon’s perceived abuse drew significant public attention to the
arrangement because his son-in-law worked for the Treasury Department,
illustrating the tax avoidance of those connected, albeit indirectly, to the tax
system.
In the early decades of the federal income tax, the Treasury
Department performed a case-by-case analysis of each partnership’s oftenmurky facts and circumstances to determine whether the partnership was
impermissibly formed for tax avoidance purposes. Consequently, cases
involving these arrangements tended to rely very precisely on their
particular facts.110 In one early case, Burnet v. Leininger, the Court held that
income from a husband–wife partnership remained taxable to the
106
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husband.111 Charles P. Leininger had agreed with his wife that she should
share equally in the partnership’s profits and losses; however, the
partnership books never reflected Mrs. Leininger’s alleged interest and she
had not taken part in the management of the business or contributed to its
capital.112 The Supreme Court characterized the agreement as an assignment
of the husband’s income—using Earl as the operative analogy.113 The mere
presence of a permissive state law and an interspousal agreement was not
enough to give a family partnership tax effect if the Court determined that
the partnership lacked substance.
In their attempts to evaluate the formation of partnerships, courts
found it difficult to apply local law consistently when examining whether
husbands and wives, in particular, formed valid partnerships. At times
courts were deferential to state law and at other times they were dismissive.
In Sunlin v. Commissioner, for example, a Michigan law forbidding
husbands and wives from forming partnerships was held to enlarge the
rights of women, not to deprive them of property, and therefore it seemed
incongruous to the court that wives would lose their interests in preexisting
businesses because of their marriages.114 As a result, the wife in the case
was held to have a valid property interest for tax purposes although she did
not have one for state property law purposes.115 Looking at the policy of
state law, the court ignored the letter of state law. It was, however, a step
toward uniform application of ownership in the federal income tax system.
This “facts and circumstances” test of ownership could be problematic
for taxpayers because they lacked assurance that the IRS would recognize
their partnerships as effectively shifting income. Partnerships risked having
their favorable tax treatment denied if they were found not to convey real
property interests under the federal test. This was a real risk; family
partnerships were found valid in only 35% of the cases brought to test their
income-shifting ability.116 And if a family failed to convince the
government of the validity of its actions, the family could be liable not only
for back taxes but also for penalties and interest covering the period it
employed the device.117 This created uncertainty in the application of the
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income tax. Despite this risk, couples took aggressive positions with
partnerships in the hopes of securing lower collective income taxes.118
To manage a growing number of family partnerships in the mid-1940s
as tax rates rose during World War II, the Court drew more specific
standards for when family partnerships created new property interests for
income tax purposes. As a result of these changes, taxpayers’ ability to split
ownership of income between family members was severely limited. In
Commissioner v. Tower and Lusthaus v. Commissioner, the Court reiterated
that the income from a family partnership was taxable to the partner who
originally owned the business unless it was a bona fide partnership; that the
partnership was valid under state law was insufficient.119 Moreover, the
Court ruled that, although the Internal Revenue Code does not require the
contribution of services or capital in its definition of a partner, the existence
of one or the other was necessary for determining whether the partnership
was bona fide.120
This ownership test still focused on the creation of the entity under a
national standard, rather than the property interests existing thereafter
under state law, and in neither case did the Court look to the attributes of
the interest the wife held. Justice Stanley Reed dissented in both Tower and
Lusthaus, with then-Chief Justice Harlan Stone joining him, arguing that
the Court was inexcusably ignoring state law as to what created a property
interest.121 One commentator complained that “we may have a business
organization which is a valid partnership by state law, and is not recognized
as such for income tax purposes; and conversely, though not recognized by
local law it may be a valid partnership under the Internal Revenue Code.”122
A legitimate concern was that if the partnership was valid under state law
and did vest an ownership interest, a taxpayer might be taxed on income
that he did not receive, was not entitled to, and did not own.123
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Despite the Court’s tests, the Treasury Department tried to issue its
own guidance for the income tax treatment of family partnerships.124 The
IRS worried that “[a]ttempts to escape surtaxes by dividing one income
into two or more incomes through the device of family partnerships present
an acute problem in the administration of the Federal income tax.”125 As a
result, the IRS argued the Internal Revenue Code taxed income to the
person who earned it or created the right to receive it or who controlled its
use.126 Even more so than the Court’s ruling, this broad definition of
ownership would allow the Treasury Department to aggregate the income
of property to one owner.
Not long thereafter, the Court backtracked from its specific
requirements of Tower and Lusthaus, but in the process the Court made it
harder to determine ex ante when a property interest for income tax
purposes had been created. In Commissioner v. Culbertson, an owner of a
cattle business financed his four sons’ partnership interests in the
business.127 The Court held that the future contribution of services could not
vest ownership of a portion of the partnership’s property in the new
partners. However, property interests would be created if “the parties in
good faith and acting with a business purpose intended to join together in
the present conduct of the enterprise.”128 As in earlier cases, the goal was to
determine not whether there was a property interest per se but whether the
creation of the partnership was bona fide. The fact that there was no
contribution of original capital or the provision of vital services to the
partnership was to be taken into consideration but was not conclusive.129
What was necessary to create a new property interest for purposes of the
federal income tax was less clear than before.
When Congress mandated in 1948 that married couples filing joint
returns artificially split their income, spouses had less economic incentive
to divide “their income through such devices as trusts, joint tenancies, and
family partnerships.”130 Nonetheless, family partnerships remained a
method for tax minimization because of the ability to shift income to other
family members. In response to the continued demand for family
partnerships, after a bill failed in 1948, Congress in 1951 introduced new
rules for determining when property interests in family partnerships were
created for income tax purposes.131 The principles were the same as those
124
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that govern the attribution of other income, namely, “income from property
is attributable to the owner of the property.”132 The same uncertainties also
applied. The reports of the House Committee on Ways and Means and the
Senate Committee on Finance both provided that the IRS and the courts
were still
free to inquire in any case whether the donee or purchaser [of a partnership
interest] actually owns the interest in the partnership . . . . [C]ases will arise
where the transferor retains so many of the incidents of ownership that he will
continue to be recognized as a substantial owner of the interest which he
purports to have given away . . . .133

The new provision provided for the reallocation of income among
partners, even if found to own a property interest in the partnership, if the
former owner did not receive reasonable compensation for his services and
a proportionate return for his capital.134 It is likely that lower taxpayer
demand for family partnerships or reduced enforcement, rather than the
inherent clarity of this new ownership standard, has quieted debate over the
ownership of family partnership interests.135
The issue was, and remains, what creates a property interest in a
partnership for federal tax purposes. Focusing on the interests instead of the
partnership’s creation, and recognizing that ownership consists of several
rights in property, one author suggested that the income of family
partnerships only be amalgamated if one person has the right to acquire the
interests of the other partners at no cost.136 Control, according to this
advocate, should not otherwise be considered as an ownership attribute
because many partnerships delegate management to one partner.137 This
approach is unlikely to be adopted. As with most other income-shifting
devices, the Court worries that retention of control or enjoyment of direct
or substantial benefits of the property “blend so imperceptibly with the
normal concepts of full ownership” to be sufficient to direct the incidence
of the tax.138
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B. Synthetic Leases
As in family partnerships, people work together to shape the
determination of who owns what in synthetic leases.139 Synthetic leases that
led, in part, to the collapse of Enron, are best known for their accounting
treatment.140 Nonetheless, the tax consequences of synthetic leases raise
interesting questions of ownership because taxpayers are allowed to ignore
the form they use in these transactions. In synthetic leases, a lessee
qualifies a lease as an operating lease for financial accounting purposes so
that it remains off the books whereas the lease qualifies as a purchase with
a mortgage for federal income tax purposes. The lessor, as nominal owner,
borrows money to buy the leased property based on the lessee’s agreement
to pay rent. The lessor then makes mortgage payments from the lessee’s
rent. Disregarding the form of these transactions, the lessor is disregarded
for tax purposes (although treated as the actual owner for accounting
purposes). Based on the economic reality of the transaction, the lessee is
treated as the tax owner of the leased property, despite not holding legal
title. This determination of ownership allows the lessee to claim
depreciation deductions on the property based on an amount including the
borrowed funds. Additionally, the lessee deducts the portion of the rental
payments attributable to interest (but not the payments traceable to the
principal of the loan) on the lessee’s deemed property. In the early years of
this type of arrangement, the depreciation deductions plus interest
deductions claimed by a lessee typically exceed the forgone rental
deduction.141 Depending upon the facts and circumstances, the IRS has
affirmed this tax treatment.142
This tax result is not surprising. Since the 1930s, lessees have been
allowed to disregard a lease’s form if the transaction is, in substance, a
purchase with a mortgage.143 In other words, depending upon the facts and
139
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circumstances, a lessee may be taxed as the owner of property despite not
having legal title.144 But the road to the favorable tax treatment of synthetic
leases has not been easy, in part because of the complicated issues of
ownership. The IRS and the courts consider numerous factors when
deciding who has the “significant and genuine attributes” of ownership for
tax purposes.145 The “substance of a transaction, rather than its legal form,
is controlling,” with the question being who “has all the burdens and
benefits of ownership.”146 The IRS compiled a list of factors based on
several Tax Court cases that should be analyzed when evaluating a
synthetic lease.147 No one factor is dispositive; therefore, a factor-by-factor
analysis is necessary. As with family partnerships, the IRS focuses more on
whether the transaction is abusive than whether taxpayers have legitimate
ownership interests.148
The IRS has not always looked at the substance of the lease
arrangement in these transactions when determining ownership, and the
prior position created inequitable results. In Bolger v. Commissioner, a
commercial user of real estate was able to lease property with the payment
to the financier (in addition to the payment of the property’s mortgage)
being the entitlement to the building’s tax depreciation deductions instead
of a cash payment.149 The IRS conceded the form of the transaction.150 The
Tax Court expressed frustration that the IRS failed to argue that the
transaction was a mortgage by the lessee.151 Because the IRS never argued
that the lessee was the owner–mortgagor, and hence the proper party to
report the depreciation deductions, the depreciation deductions were
stripped from the true owner–borrower and assigned first to the financing
corporation, which in turn assigned them to the financier.152
The IRS now generally accepts that the lessee is the owner of synthetic
leases but this requires a complex weighing of the facts. In Sun Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, the question was whether the lessee could deduct the “rent”
it paid when the tax-exempt status of the lessor precluded an offsetting
inclusion in income.153 The IRS argued that the lessee retained an equity
interest in the property and therefore could not obtain a Section 162(a)
deduction for the rental “of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or
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is not taking title or in which he has no equity.”154 Because the lessee
retained all the benefits and burdens of ownership, the lessee could deduct
only the portion of the “rent” that was traceable to a payment of interest
and not the portion attributable to the repayment of principal.155 The Third
Circuit accepted that the benefits and burdens of ownership could be
allocated any number of ways between a landlord and a tenant of
commercial real estate: “The usual business bargain between a commercial
lessor and lessee is far more complex. Real estate interests between a lessor
and lessee normally are divided into a number of parts, each of which
represents an ownership interest in property.”156
Because of this complex weighing of facts, the IRS has at times lost
the ownership classification, resulting in the taxpayer winning an unjust
income tax reduction. In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, a bank entered
into a sale–leaseback of a building with the Frank Lyon Company, a
closely held corporation whose majority shareholder and board chair was
also a member of the bank’s board.157 The bank “sold” the building as it
was constructed to the Lyon Company and “leased” the building back, also
receiving a number of options to repurchase the building.158 The bank, as
lessee, was obligated for rent and to pay all maintenance, repairs, taxes, and
insurance on the building.159 In addition, the bank’s obligation to pay net
rent was absolute and unconditional, even in the event of destruction of the
building.160 The bank could repurchase the building at any time by
prepaying the mortgage with accrued interest.161 Consistent with its formal
ownership of the building, the Lyon Company reported depreciation
deductions on its cost.162
The IRS took the position that the lease and options made the bank the
owner of the building such that the bank, rather than the Lyon Company,
was entitled to its depreciation deductions.163 The Eighth Circuit agreed.164
The Eighth Circuit held that ownership was a “bundle of sticks” and that
the Lyon Company “totes an empty bundle and that the term ‘owner’ for
tax purposes cannot reasonably be attached to the empty wrapping taxpayer
has retained.”165 The Lyon Company’s only economic advantage for its
154
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“ownership” was the income tax advantages it claimed from the
depreciation deductions in the early years of the lease.166
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit.167 The Court
concluded that none of the parties owned the building in any simple sense
and, therefore, as long as the lessor retained significant attributes of a
traditional lessor status the parties could allocate depreciation deductions
within reasonable limits.168 The Court’s summary of the facts focused on
the Lyon Company’s risk: the Lyon Company, not the bank, was liable for
the note, and the Lyon Company was not even assured of a return of its
money plus interest.169 “This possibility brings into sharp focus the fact that
Lyon [Company], in a very practical sense, is at least the ultimate owner of
the building.”170 However, the Lyon Company was not a traditional owner–
lessor. The bank controlled the use of the building, and the structure of its
options to purchase the building captured all of its potential appreciation in
value unless the new building was condemned prior to the date of the
bank’s first repurchase option.171 In addition to having the benefits of
ownership, the bank also bore the burden of the building’s operating costs
and an unconditional promise to pay rent.172 The Court did not consider
these attributes of ownership persuasive.173
C. Broader Implications
The consequences of applying complex and undefined tests to
determine ownership and property for the application of the federal income
tax extend beyond the revenue raised or foregone. One consequence is
pressure applied to change interpretations of state property law. For
example, with respect to family partnerships, failure to secure favorable tax
results caused some families to invalidate state law property interests. In
Stone v. Stone, Michigan courts allowed a husband and wife to set aside
gifts of partnership interests to their eleven-year-old children when the
federal tax savings did not materialize.174 According to the court, “The
consequences of requiring the father to pay the income tax on the entire
income of a partnership in the earnings of which he has but a one quarter
166
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interest can readily be imagined.”175 Thus, the federal income tax has
altered the application of property law in the states.176 Notwithstanding this
risk, no single model of “ownership” has been crafted that applies for tax
purposes, and determining who is the appropriate owner of a given piece of
income-producing property often remains a “close call.”177 A consequence
of this is that for taxpayers and the IRS, determining ex ante if a particular
attribute of ownership is sufficient to produce taxable income is confusing,
at best. This confusion may confound taxpayers’ ability to plan for other,
non-tax-related matters.
CONCLUSION
Congress has not grappled with what it means to own something for
federal income tax purposes even though the conception of property as a
bundle of rights gained traction as the new tax developed. Congress failed
to anticipate that the bundle of rights concept would result in the
proliferation of property interests in income-producing assets. As a result,
taxpayers can use the existence of myriad property interests in the same
taxable item to minimize their income taxes. The result has been
problematic for the tax. In response to these problems, Congress could
adopt a definition of ownership that would override state law issues and
clarify what ownership attributes are sufficient to trigger the tax. However,
it would be difficult (and politically unlikely) for congressional action to
override the different conceptions of what property is. In the face of likely
inaction on this issue, policymakers need to be aware of the complications
for income tax purposes inherent in the idea of ownership and property.
There are consequences to not basing taxation on a well-thought-out
and consistent definition of ownership. First, what happens if two people
should be subject to tax on the same income or if the person subject to tax
on a given amount of income is unable to access the income to pay the
taxes owed? The Treasury Department once declared, “[T]he Internal
Revenue Code taxes income to the person who earns it, or who creates the
right to receive it, or who controls its use.”178 This could be many people at
the same time. Consider Helvering v. Clifford, when a husband created a
trust to pay the income earned on securities to his wife, but the husband
retained the right to change the trust’s terms. The Court held that the
husband was the owner of the corpus.179 However, if the wife had an
ownership interest under state law, arguably she should be taxed on the
trust’s income, as was her husband under the Court’s decision. Moreover,
she might not be legally obligated to provide him the revenue to pay the
175
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taxes he owed on her income. Thus the trust’s income is “of” both spouses
for income tax purposes but not necessarily any other purpose. This
multiple taxation has occurred in the past. As noted in 1921, the
government taxed two people on the same income earned from a trust
because the rules were not based on a singular view of property or
ownership.180
To the extent that we adopt a more nuanced view of ownership for tax
purposes, it is possible that other issues for the income tax, such as tax
shelters, could be more easily addressed. Using a settled definition of who
really owns and should be taxed on income generated by property may be
less convoluted than trying to undo or negate transactions. Additionally,
employing a real sense of ownership for the imposition of the income tax
would allow taxpayers to be taxed more accurately according to their
ability to pay taxes. Ownership of any type of property rights carries with it
other benefits, such as increased political and social power, that may have
far-ranging effects beyond the piece of property itself. These other
privileges cannot be taxed directly under the current system, or indirectly
by taxing the property interest that gives rise to that power, if the interest is
held to be owned by someone else. Linking ownership to the correct person
best provides the government the tools to tax everyone according to their
real ability to pay.
Developing a theory of ownership for tax purposes is beyond the
scope of this Article. Therefore, this inquiry may raise more questions than
it answers. Does property for tax purposes have to be the same as for other
purposes? If property must have a limited number of standard forms, if
only to reduce the transaction costs of knowing who owns what property,
do those limits apply in the world of tax? If so, is the objective to limit the
cost to the government of ascertaining who owns what, and is that a fair
limitation on property? These questions need to be answered if we want to
operate in a world where the federal income tax applies correctly to the
income of an individual.
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